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1 – Introduction 
Complex systems are used, studied and instantiated in science. 
What are the consequences of this? For clarity, distinguish the 
following, partly interrelated, questions: 
Q1. What are the consequences, for science, of science using 
and studying complex systems? 
Q2. What are the consequences, for philosophy of science, of 
science using and studying complex systems? 
Q3. What are the consequences, for philosophy of science, 
of philosophy of science modelling science as a complex sys-
tem? 
In what follows these questions will be addressed, in order, with 
more attention given as we proceed since, while none of these 
questions has well established responses, they are numbered 
from best to least understood. With respect to the discovery and 
subsequent permeation of complex systems throughout science 
over the past roughly 70 years, Q1 inquires about the impact this 
has had on doing science, for instance on constructing scientif-
ic models, methods and explanations. Q2, by contrast, focuses 
on the impact of these developments on philosophy of science, 
for instance in a possible separation of explanation from pre-
diction, or a new model of emergence. Finally, Q3 is concerned 
with whether science itself is a complex system in important 
respects and how this might change our conception of science 
and thereby query what a philosophy of science adequate to 
this complexity might look like. There is a corresponding line of 
questions that pertain to social science modelling, including of 
science, for example concerning complexity in economic models 
of science; but given the huge, very diverse and uneven, litera-
tures involved, and the present constraints on space, they will 
not be pursued here.
2 – Q1. What are the conse-
quences, for science, of sci-
ence using and studying com-
plex systems? 
Complex systems are not simply a new collection of empirical 
models alongside all the others as, say, replacing traffic signals 
with roundabouts might be added to traffic-flow models with-
out introducing any new fundamental ideas. Rather, they have 
introduced many new concepts and models to science that have 
irrevocably expanded its models, theories and methods. This is 
no place to begin to set out a systematic review of these, which 
would be at least book-length in scope and is in any case largely 
now available elsewhere (see Hooker (2011a), and references). 
Here the point will be briefly illustrated by listing just some of 
the new concepts and methods involved so as to indicate the dis-
tinctive impact of the new ideas, without claiming completeness 
or attempting grander abstractions. What follows is drawn from 
Hooker (2011a), especially (2011b). References to system states 
are to dynamical conditions and behaviours; cognitive states 
and functional states more generally are a further matter. Inter-
ested readers are invited to follow up the ideas in the literature 
(above). 
Complex systems are used, studied and instantiated in science, with what con-
sequences? To be clear and systematic in response it is necessary to distin-
guish the consequences, (i) for science, of science using and studying complex 
systems, (ii) for philosophy of science, of science using and studying complex 
systems, (iii) for philosophy of science, of philosophy of science modelling sci-
ence as a complex system. Each of these is explored in turn, especially (iii). 
While (iii) has been least studied, it will be shown how modelling science as 
a complex process may change our conception of science and thereby query 
what a philosophy of science adequate to this complexity might look like.
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Complex Systems Concepts 
• bifurcations - shifts of system state that are also shifts 
of dynamical form (e.g. phase changes from solid to liq-
uid to gas). 
• criticality - a state in which the distribution of fluctua-
tions is scale-invariant (big and small changes equally 
probable). 
• global constraints - constraints whose satisfaction re-
quires system-wide interdependencies (e.g. a machine 
all of whose diverse parts must fit properly together to 
work). 
• self-organisation - formation of a new system con-
straint and consequent new orderedness (e.g. forma-
tion of new crystalline constraint in phase change from 
liquid to solid).
• stochasticity (non-quantal) - inherent system fluctu-
ations in a strange attractor (chaos), or near to one: 
‘pink’ (1/f) emission spectrum (size of changes decreas-
es as their frequency increases).
Complex Systems Methods 
• attractor basin analysis - global dynamical represen-
tations, including system stability domains (system 
locked into a repeating state sequence), near-bound-
ary stability analysis (where fluctuations may transfer 
systems across basin boundaries) and close bifurcation 
boundaries (containing closely inter-packed points 
from touching basins), and transitions between differ-
ent possible dynamical forms (as basin deformations). 
• model-centredness - digital simulation of equa-
tion-specified dynamics in the absence of solving dy-
namical equations in known algebraic functions (e.g. 
sine waves). 
• multi-agent dynamics - simulate collective processes 
(e.g. bee or termite colonies) as the outcomes of inter-
action rules among their members (e.g. bees, termites), 
including cases where intermediary sub-collective or-
ganisation emerges (network theory, e.g. ‘small worlds’ 
that dominate collective processes).
• stochastic analysis - non-standard statistical analyses, 
including complexity-generated ‘fat-tailed’ fluctuations 
(more highly improbable events than a completely ran-
dom distribution could be expected to generate). 
There is as yet no nice consolidation of these and other con-
cepts and methods into something that could be called a new 
unified paradigm for doing science. Nonetheless, distinctive 
concepts, methods, and explanatory foci (see below), accompa-
nied by now with hundreds of empirically supported exemplars 
that pre-complexity analysis cannot treat, are the stuff of para-
digm formation, suggesting that a new paradigm may be form-
ing.
3 – Q2. What are the conse-
quences, for philosophy of 
science, of science using and 
studying complex systems? 
These consequences essentially fall into two categories, issues 
for epistemology and method, and issues for metaphysics. The 
former are arguably the more philosophically significant and will 
be treated first. Once again, in place of book-length exposition 
just some of the new concepts will be briefly listed so as to in-
dicate the distinctive impact of the new ideas, without claiming 
completeness or attempting grander abstractions. What follows 
is drawn from Hooker (2011c) and other chapters in (2011a). 
Complex Systems Epistemology 
• Condition-dependence - the idea that, since dynamics 
can transform its own form as systems evolve/develop, 
the laws governing a system can change as it nears such 
bifurcation states and thus be state-dependent and so 
also state-dependent will be correlative generalisation, 
explanation and error (kinds, quantities).
• Explanation with constrained prediction, and vice ver-
sa - includes attractor basin identification versus tra-
jectory knowledge, including trajectories for ‘strange’ 
attractors (chaos) and inter-basin transitions. 
• Intelligibility versus predictability - Machine Learning 
(prediction for complex systems but non-interpretable 
internal generating states) versus physical modelling 
(physical intelligibility but low predictability for com-
plex systems). See further Hooker and Hooker (2017).
• Limits to mathematical representation, and digital 
simulation - work done against constraints, for in-
stance in self-organisation, for which there is no La-
grangian or Hamiltonian representation of dynamics; 
where round-up errors swamp dynamical distinctions, 
including simulation of fine-grained trajectories (e.g. in 
bifurcations); (more generally) unavailability of known 
mathematical solution functions for equation sets. 
• Poly-ocular perspectivalism - various different ways to 
specify dynamics, including partial versus whole (e.g. 
confined to one basin), idealised (collapsing out dy-
namical structures) or not. (NB: this perspectivalism is 
distinct from metaphysical versions.) 
• Societal explanatory orientation - from static struc-
tures (e.g. timeless religious or governance institutions) 
to contingent dynamical equilibria (e.g. where long 
term processes like social inequity and ecological de-
generation bring about system disruption and transfor-
mation, see further below.)1
Complex Systems Metaphysics 
• Decomposition and unification - see emergence/reduc-
tion, identity and causality entries below. 
• Emergence/reduction relations - not opposites but 
inter-dependent complements understood via con-
straints and constraint formation (see self-organisa-
tion under Q1 above), a dynamical, not logical, relation 
(note 2).
• Identity criteria - standard options, like sameness of 
persisting components, fail because function, caus-
al power and component stability can all be changed 
through dynamical bifurcation (self-organisation, etc.), 
suggesting sameness of dynamical landscape trajectory 
as a basis for identity (cf. determinism below). 
• Restricted causality; determinism versus causality 
- causality is not applicable to self-organisation and 
emergence since a new identity is formed, yet deter-
minism continues to apply; feedback and transforma-
tion displace structural with dynamical process concep-
1 - There are, in addition, universal limits on scientific knowledge, e.g. (i) resource finitude, including finite funding, but also finite round up errors in complex 
system modelling, (ii) type I/II error trade-offs because it is typically impossible to remove both at once, (iii) uncertain inductive guidance, so that many research 
opportunities will not be pursued that otherwise would be eligible to pursue.
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tions.2 
Each of these entries deserves extended discussion. Instead, just 
explanatory orientation will be considered in a little more detail 
to better indicate its impact on traditional methodology and, es-
pecially here, on epistemology. (See Hooker (2011c, §5.3). Com-
pare, e.g., Gao and Herfel (2011) on ecological analysis, Herfel, 
Gao and Rodrigues (2011) on traditional Chinese medicine, and 
Brinsmead and Hooker (2011) for its impact on policy, the coun-
terpart to method.)
Prior to the dynamical perspective introduced by complex 
systems it was common to assume a stasis-and-disruptive-
step-returning-to-new-stasis model of change. For Kuhn, for 
instance, scientific change falls into two kinds. (A) Intra-stage 
puzzle-solving under a fixed paradigm, marked by small varia-
tions and low-level impacts. (B) Inter-stage revolutions marked 
by large changes of concepts, principles and methods as well as 
data, with stases mutually incommensurable. The (A) changes 
are assumed logical, so considered rational; the (B) changes are 
non-logical, so considered non-rational. Such dichotomising 
was common at the time, for example Evolutionary Punctuated 
Equilibria (Gould and Elderedge, 1977), Climax Ecology (Cle-
ments (1928)/1973, cf. Gunderson and Holling 2002), Devel-
opmental Psychology (Piaget 1957, cf. Hooker 1994), Dialectic 
(Marx - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectic#Marx-
ist_dialectic) and Archeological Succcession (van der Leeuw 
2004). In pre-systems times (before 1960, say) this schema for 
understanding was close to an assumed explanatory paradigm. 
Toulmin’s principles of natural order (1961) even called for its 
basis to be exempt from explanation, qua presupposed. 
By contrast, in a dynamical systems context, a stasis is a dy-
namical (not passive) equilibrium, that is, a condition stabilised 
by the remaining ongoing system processes, as waves in river 
rapids are sustained by the water flow itself. Such dynamical 
stabilities are resilient against some perturbations or chang-
es to system conditions (e.g. a kayak oar dipped into the river) 
but are alterable by others (e.g. a fallen rock partially blocking 
flow). Hence the focal issues shift from determining whether 
stasis or revolution applies to instead determining the dynam-
ical systems features that predominately explain system be-
haviours. This occasions a shift from extracting common stage 
uniformities from data on diverse cases to acquiring data on (i) 
variabilities in phase, interaction, output, and so on, (ii) differ-
ing equilibrium types (static/dynamic, stable/meta-stable, dis-
sipation/constraint driven …), and (iii) dynamical landscape 
dependencies (closures, self-organisation, ...). The staircase of 
stages is replaced by a dynamical system path across a dynamic 
landscape of multiple attractor kinds, each kind representing an 
arrangement, of ecology or of culture and governance, etc., that 
has its own resilient stabilising features (e.g. water regulation, 
wealth rewards) but also its particular vulnerabilities to per-
turbations (e.g. water regulation rupture in extended drought, 
stress produced by social inequity). Movement along the sys-
tem path is driven by external inputs (e.g. trade, conflict) and 
internal variation (e.g. in cultural groups, in water resources, in 
traded goods) and can show all of the complexities expressed in 
dynamical landscapes, for example small errors or inadequacies 
that can be amplified to major crises and self-organisation that 
generates and reinforces new social divisions. In such dynam-
ic landscapes change is characterised by sub-optimality (‘good 
enough to function’) and non-uniformity, rather than the opti-
mality and uniformity of the fixed stages. Data collection meth-
ods change to be adequate to system identification in dynamical 
terms (above), dynamical landscape analysis methods change to 
be adequate to understanding system behaviour. This too is the 
stuff of paradigm change.3
4 – Q3. What are the conse-
quences, for philosophy of sci-
ence, of philosophy of science 
modelling science as a com-
plex system? 
Though currently few philosophers of science approach science 
as a complex system, let us this once begin on that basis. Then 
the consequences are of two kinds: consequences for how sci-
ence itself is most insightfully modelled, and consequences for 
formulating a philosophical paradigm for understanding sci-
ence, that is, for rationalising scientific knowledge, within that 
approach. The former is a deep but young problem, scarcely ad-
dressed. It will receive only an initial and challenging, character-
isation here. The latter is still less developed but only because it 
has been dominated by the inadequate answer of analytic ortho-
doxy. Setting this latter aside, a very different, but I think more 
compelling, and somewhat original, proposal will present itself 
and be developed. 
4.1 Q3(I): How is science itself most insightful-
ly modelled?
Or, crudely, what is to replace the Kuhnian staircase? Science is 
clearly a highly dynamical process, undergoing constant change, 
much of it self-generated, and across a huge range of time scales, 
from the 300 year examination of Mercury’s orbit, to the 30 year 
development of Ape language research (see below), to the min-
ute-by-minute conduct of an experiment. In that context, longer 
term processes set the constraints for shorter term processes, for 
instance an experiment will in general accept the tools, methods 
and finances to hand. Modelling science might then begin by 
characterising three longer-term partial modelling frameworks, 
or PFrames, for characterising science: 
PFrame 1. Three quasi-independent, accumulative processes 
that provide critical resources for science: technology, percep-
tion, proto-theory. (I) Perception. Across the centuries science 
has been correcting (glasses, monitoring), augmenting (micro-, 
tele- scopes), and replacing (radio-telescopes, ultra-sonogra-
2 - An ontological Perspectivalism may also be adopted where systems ontology is theorised as a composite of ontologically distinct and possibly incompatible 
partial perspectives (cf. Epistemology above). Hooker (2011c) argues against this that the notion arises only from inappropriate reliance on logical structures, 
that it thus imports an arbitrary human fiat, and anyway that dynamical distinctions within a larger dynamical process ontology suffice to understand the science 
within a single systems ontology. This applies to understanding explanation (below) and much else.
3 - This discussion should make clear that I regard all these dichotomist theories as simple first approximations to be succeeded by richer systems process models. 
In what follows I use the term ‘paradigm’, but without Kuhn’s sharp logical/non-logical dichotomy and so without either the incommensurability or the internal 
globalness of each stasis.
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phy, electron- and neutron- microscopes) native perception, a 
process that both hugely supports science and is supported by 
science and continues to expand. (II) Technology. Perception 
and other technologies (digital, telemetry, quantal, ...) have 
both improved scientific capacity for research (video recording 
of data, radio astronomy) and been transformed by scientific 
insight (e.g. mathematics of cryptography and reliable signal-
ling). (III) Proto-theory (kinematics of mechanics, generalised 
formal and statistical inference, etc.) provides ever richer pos-
sibility frameworks to support scientific theoretical and meth-
odological development, and stimulate further proto-theoretic 
framework development. These three frameworks have each 
developed somewhat independently of science, having rich lives 
in the wider economy (e.g. ultra-sonography in medicine, lasers 
in building) and each is also partly self-regenerative and self-im-
proving (e.g. lasers created new demands for their use, in turn 
leading to development of new and improved kinds of lasers). 
Between them they frame scientific activities and sustain their 
improvement and expand their scopes while scientific advance 
in turn feeds their own development. 
PFrame 2. The science-PFrame 1 inter-relationships form the 
first of two inter-locked positive reinforcement processes, scien-
tific and societal. (I) PFrame 1 inter-relationships. It has already 
been remarked above how new technologies (perceptual and 
other) and new proto theories provide science with new instru-
ments and other methods and so stimulate its further develop-
ment, while developing science provides new and/or improved 
technologies and methods, thus stimulating their development 
in the wider economy as well as in science, which in turn creates 
wealth that partly also feeds back to the economic (and cultural) 
support of science. Considering for convenience proto theory as 
an intellectual technology, call this dynamic science-PFrame 1 
reinforcement system the science-technology change machine. 
(II) Three inter-locked institutional transformations form the 
societal change machine: (i) An economic transition from tra-
ditional hierarchical fixed economies like feudalism to a market 
economy, where exploitation of novelty provides wealth oppor-
tunity, the only source of security. (ii) A political transition from 
the inherited power structure of archbishop and king to that of 
representative democracy, where political saleability provides 
power opportunity, the only security. (iii) A religious transition 
from the traditional communal Catholic Church to individualist 
Protestant churches, where personal relation to the divine is the 
only security, removing church constraint. All three open up the 
future, emphasising individual opportunity and lowering social 
resistance to change. Together they unleashed massive societal 
change, itself supported by a flow of new ideas and technologies 
from science, and also feed back to support science for its gen-
eration of new capacities. These two great change machines, I + 
II, are mutually reinforcing and have been increasing in size and 
speed for 400 years now, transforming science and all societies. 
PFrame 3. Three inter-locked developmental processes: under-
standing the empirical world, understanding our understand-
ing processes and understanding the conditions of scientific 
flourishing. As perception illustrates, science studies us as well 
as the larger natural world, producing a science-amenable un-
derstanding of both. All three understandings emerge essential-
ly through problem solving processes (see below), however the 
latter two are as often in tension with, as supportive of, market 
imperatives. 
In addition, there are three factors complicating any attempt 
at systems modelling of science. (1) In the dichotomous ana-
lytic world the cognitive moves (prediction, explanation, etc.) 
are confined to a closed world of logical inference, but not so 
in the integrated naturalistic world of modelling here. And in 
fact all of the long-term processes above can operate in a prag-
matic, physical mode, which is at least a-epistemic and may be 
non-cognitive. For example, a magnifying lens can also become 
a heat concentrator through physical placement, perhaps by ac-
cident or undirected play; whatever the case, at the time this act 
runs outside of rational scientific conceptualisation and investi-
gation, introducing cognitively un-regulated novelty to science. 
(It may be captured for science in retrospect.) Likewise, techno-
logical development in the market place may remain within the 
broadly cognitive, qua strategic, but for the most part it is eco-
nomically driven, not epistemically driven; so when its products 
filter back into science it can again form a source of un-regulat-
ed novelty for science. These sources subvert the use of whol-
ly internal, cognitive conceptual-strategic models of scientific 
process, such as has been encouraged by the purely logico-in-
ferential model of scientific method, leaving its processes a mix 
of epistemic rational, non-epistemic strategic rational, and a-ra-
tional.4 (2) Science involves specialised interactions that reach 
out beyond the immediate research context, e.g. from a biologist 
to a chemist or mathematician, and outlier risk-taking strate-
gies that traverse collective agreements, e.g. those agreements 
for supporting a current disciplinary research foci. Both features 
are often ephemeral but crucial to dynamics. Also, as science ex-
pands and complexifies it is driven to construct ever more com-
plex multi-disciplinary, multi-national, moderately long-lived, 
research arrangements that further mediate scientist-scientist 
linkages.5 (3) Scientists have many highly conditional, meta-sta-
ble commitments that can be triggered to shift by highly special-
ised signals, the consequences spreading throughout the rest of 
science, in part via (1) and (2).6 
To all this must be added all the more familiar shorter term 
processes of laboratory activity, conference and journal pre-
sentations and disputes, etc. Given these complications it is un-
surprising to find theories purporting to rise above the detail to 
capture the essential process of science. The commonest ways 
philosophers of science attempt this is to argue for a distinct, 
higher order realm of normatively binding procedures, notably 
logic, whose use distinguishes science as an enterprise uniquely 
focused on the epistemic goal of truth. However, as already not-
4 - These non-cognitive elements can also occur within scientific methods, e.g. hand cutting to a physical pattern (a drawing, etc.) versus using an equivalent 
digital pattern to drive an electric saw. While outcome equivalent, the distinction between the two methods is important, e.g. they offer very different learning 
possibilities.
5 - A good example is the discussion by Ankeny and Leonelli (2016) of what they call repertoires, and references to many other ideas therein. While their approach 
risks cognitive/epistemic direction being lost in the detail, analyses like Andersen (2016) run the reverse risk of failing to notice such structures, but also contribute 
interesting more global features to modelling.
6 - Note that the foregoing offers a holistic product-of-processes characterisation of science quite different to decomposition into products of weakly interacting 
parts, e.g. Simon’s near-decomposability (1982), and decomposition into mean-field and fluctuation dynamics, e.g. in the bio-econo-social sciences - see Auyang 
(1998).
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ed, the approach has proven deeply inadequate to its purpose 
(see below). This frees us up to consider instead systems dynam-
ic approaches to the issue. Here are brief comments on three 
of these: organic (macro organisational), evolutionary (macro 
populational), self-organisational (micro-macro emergentist). 
(1) Organic modelling includes viable system and autono-
my versions, each claiming that features of internal organism 
organisation, respectively (a) parts with organ-like functions 
(digestion, toxin removal, etc.) and (b) a capacity to wholly re-
generate oneself, must also apply to science as a whole. See e.g. 
and respectively Espejo and Harnden (1989) and Moreno and 
Mossio (2016). But in each case it is obscure how their core re-
quirement, even were it granted, might illuminate scientific cog-
nitive processes and the correlative diverse institutional roles 
that embody them. (Within the (b) variant, a successful defence 
of closure as constituting semantic information might provide 
an exception — the issue is left open here.) (2) A minimal evo-
lutionary process occurs wherever there is a VSR (variation, 
selection, retention) process which, abstracting from requiring 
a genetic basis, is nearly universal. Without the appropriate em-
bedding infrastructure (e.g. bird physiology undergirding flight) 
it is uninformative; with it, it is highly specific. Again, how to ap-
ply these models? What illumination would follow? (3) Self-or-
ganisation is a recognised process; a common example is where 
increased throughput induces specialisation. Science will show 
many such instances, and Shi contends that the public cogni-
tive rules for science self-organise from the economic roles of 
scientists as investors, entrepreneurs, and project managers in 
research. See Shi (2001), cf. van der Leeuw’s (2004) principle 
that institutions emerge from individual action, also Hooker 
(2011b, §5.3). Shi’s contention has major consequences for un-
derstanding science generally (see below), but these are again 
higher order uniformities, they do not yet illuminate its diverse 
detail.7 The questions remain: How to apply the models? What 
illumination would follow? In sum, while aspects of these three 
higher order processes may well apply to science (in fact surely 
must apply, at least in part), they cannot provide in themselves 
an adequate basis for modelling scientific activities. 
In consequence of its wide variety of scales for key processes, 
coupled with their idiosyncrasy to problem, methods, etc. and 
all the other considerations noted above under PFrames 1, 2 and 
3, plus an absence of appropriate theoretical models generally, 
science is currently recalcitrant to modelling, and will perhaps 
always remain so beyond some highly general modelling like 
that above and some more specific modelling (see e.g. note 7).
4.2 Q3(II): Consequences for formulating a 
paradigm of scientific understanding
 4.2.1. From logic to problem solving
In understanding science we minimally want to know how it 
produces informative, reliable and usable outcomes through a 
rational process. Scientific epistemology then revolves around 
having a method capable of delivering these valuable outcomes. 
From a systems perspective, an answer should specify a process 
that is as effective at delivering the desired valuable outcomes as 
is reasonable for finite, fallible inquirers and that can be adapted 
to apply to each research context in ways that model science as 
a stable, productive, but also highly adaptable, system. But, cut-
ting all that off, traditional analytic philosophy has, as noted un-
der Q3(I), a quick, neat, very different answer: method is logical 
deduction, that guarantees its rationality, and, since deduction 
is truth preserving, it equally guarantees that all output deduced 
from true factual inputs (basic data) will in turn be true. 
However, logic alone is multiply inadequate to this role, for 
reasons now well understood. (a) Data are not guaranteed 
true, rather they are fallible, potentially containing both errors 
of detail and larger built-in errors of presupposition. Both de-
fects require critical investigation of data as much as does any 
other part of science. (b) Deductive inference is conceptually 
non-creative, so cannot encompass theoretical concepts, and it 
is non-ampliative, so cannot even encompass generalisation. (c) 
The stark separation of method as a priori and normative from 
a posteriori empirical data and theory runs against the massive 
interaction between method and science over the history of 
science. And so on. Attempts to generalise logic to repair these 
inadequacies have never succeeded and arguably cannot do so. 
(See note 9 below.) 
So, rejecting a priorism for finitist, fallibilist, naturalism in which 
norms are learned as theories of how best to flourish, we search 
for a conception of method that should be applicable throughout 
science, focused on rational epistemic improvement, grounded 
in actual competencies of science, and itself along with science 
be fallibly improvable. Cutting a long story short, I suggest the 
most satisfying candidate is problem solving. Problems abound 
in science: How to accurately and reliably detect this condition? 
Test this theory? Generalise this pattern? Apply this molecule to 
achieve a cure? Scientists are constantly faced with such prob-
lems and manage to solve many of them more or less satisfacto-
rily, the point of doing so being to improve our knowledge, our 
instruments, etc. etc. Method becomes how we go about ratio-
nally solving problems. The account of problem solving I shall 
give is itself rooted in the study of problem solving processes, 
in particular research into design and science problem solving 
and aspects of cognitive psychology. With norms considered fal-
lible, constructed theories concerning how to flourish, we have a 
virtuous upward spiral in which epistemic theory improves sci-
ence, which in turn improves epistemic theory and through the 
same problem solving processes.8 Indeed, and finally, we shall 
see (below) how that kind self-improvement stands at the core 
of problem solving processes and uniquely creates expertise. 
Self-improvement is its fallible, but essential, competence.
 4.2.2. Naturalist non-formal rationality
The naturalist account of rationality required for a theory of ra-
tional problem solving comes in two forms, an Outer Form of 
natural rationality [OFNR], a more general form that provides 
the fundamental resources for reason and a basic task orien-
tation to their use, and a more specific Inner Form of natural 
rationality [IFNR], though still universally applicable, that mod-
els the generic internal structure of the rational problem solv-
7 - It might if a suitable multi-agent evolutionary model were available of the Holland ECHO kind in which individuals could be role-tagged in some way and such tags themselves 
suitably evolve through specific individual successes and failures, see Holland (1992), cf. Hooker (1995a), http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/projects/echo/
8 - While analytic philosophers might try to render such relationships in logical terms, to a systems modeller this looks like any two-component feedback process: success leads to 
further elaboration (positive feedback), failure leads to revision and ultimately abandonment (negative feedback).
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ing process. Call the model a Universal Problem Solving [UPS] 
process. Arguably the UPS provides the most detailed but still 
universally general model of rational problem solving. After that 
one obtains more specific models of rational problem solving 
in specific subfields and interdisciplinary matrices, obtained 
by loading more specific constructs into the IFNR, from disci-
plinary paradigms to Ankeny/Leonelli-style repertoires (note 
5). 
OFNR. In the exercise of reason, there are four principal re-
sources or means for the improvement of judgement: observa-
tion, forms of reasoning (formal and non-formal), constrained 
but creative construction, and critical appraisal. These four 
bundles of processes are utilised by both individuals and com-
munal groupings of various kinds: in science by scientists, labo-
ratories, learned societies, collaborative and discussion groups, 
universities, etc. Each of these four domains generates a set of 
constraints on rational procedure and these constraints mutual-
ly interact in complex ways. For instance, observation requires 
perceptual accessibility, balance, etc. and the requirement for 
systematic critical appraisal may lead to introducing new per-
sons to an evaluation process, persons that synergistically also 
add to the variety of observations brought to bear on the situa-
tion. Each of these four means of improving judgment will con-
tribute to both elaborating reasons for, and critical challenges 
to, our judgements, leading to improved judgements, and each 
of them will also play various roles in developing our rational 
skills further.9 
The ideal of reason is the unlimited use of the instrument by 
which we seek to transcend present imperfections. Thus, the 
ideal of reason is to increase without limit the acquiring of rele-
vant observational data, the canvassing of relevant reasons, the 
creative construction of relevant structures and processes and 
subjecting all to critical appraisal. The working standard is to 
pursue the ideal to the maximum feasible extent. It is the right 
kind of rationality ideal and standard for finite imperfect crea-
tures. It also satisfies the requirements of a Kantian regulatory 
ideal, namely to be ideally rational is desirable, it is possible to 
move towards the ideally rational state, and doing so has desir-
able consequences. 
IFNR. As noted above, the UPS model emerged from the unifi-
cation of several lines of inquiry into problem solving process, 
namely in design, science, psychology and biological organisa-
tion and has been presented in some detail elsewhere.10 It suf-
fices for present purposes to simply present its main features 
with brief illustration. The UPS model recognises five main foci 
of formulation and re-formulation that characteristically occur 
during a problem solving process: problem formulations, solu-
tion formulations, methods, data indicating constraints on the 
system, and partial solution proposals. Each of these represents 
a kind of possibility: possible problem formulations, possible 
solution formulations, etc. A bundle of possibilities, one drawn 
from each node, represents a possible framework for conducting 
a problem solving trial. But possibilities are interrelated across 
nodes, so that coherent frameworks are much fewer. It is these 
latter that form the base layer organising the UPS process. In 
the problem solving process each and all of these five nodes may 
alter their focal possibility several times. 
Consider, in simplified illustration, the design of a new bank 
branch. There will be established designs for the usual ‘shop 
front’ branch but it soon emerges these don’t work on the square 
lot available. The designer tries modifying the standard linear 
arrangement, but none are satisfactory. By now the problem has 
shifted from ‘fit a standard design’ to ‘find a layout that fits all 
functions to the space’, to ‘find a branch organisation that ac-
commodates a square lot (without sacrificing functions)’, the 
solution criteria have changed accordingly — to, say, ‘minimise 
congestion and leave all functions accessible’ — as have the 
partial design proposals tested. Again finding no satisfaction, 
the designer then ‘relaxes’ the implicit constraint to a single, 
street-level design, to allow some functions to be located on 
higher floors. This move would reduce upstairs tenant income 
and increase demand for vertical movement (elevators, stairs) 
and customer pathway guidance. But besides including all stan-
dard functions, this arrangement also offers increased customer 
capacity to follow idiosyncratic paths, and opportunity to con-
tact extended customer services (e.g. architect, project manage-
ment, legal and taxation services). It also requires obtaining new 
data on customer banking needs and movement assistance and 
new methods to analyse and plan customer paths and provide 
access, along with problem reformulation to ‘Find a design that 
effectively utilises multi-floor, multi-path banking.’ Method 
might now aim for minimisation of average path length and/
or transit time and optimisation of interaction with appropriate 
non-banking functions. All up we now have a substantial shift in 
all five design possibility nodes, problem and correlative solu-
tion formulations, method, constraints and trial partial solution 
proposals. This amounts to a re-orienting shift to a whole-of-
building, integrated services design approach. The example 
illustrates how one iteration of problem solving prepares the 
ground for its successor and how revolutions can arise rational-
ly if powerful enough problem solving options and information 
are available, without necessary appeal to genius insights. (See 
e.g. Koestler 1959.) 
But none of this will support improvement unless there is some 
way to learn from problem solving, and learning presupposes a 
way to remember the relevant moves and outcomes. So, for each 
problem, each node is equipped with a memory of its possibili-
ties tried and their outcome values contributed, each such entry 
tagged to the framework used. The point of this is to identify 
trends in value produced, the direction(s) of increasing failure, 
to be avoided, and of increasing success, to be pursued through 
choice of suitably modified frameworks. But frameworks span 
the 5 nodes, so what is ultimately needed is an integrated mem-
9 - See further Hooker (1995b, 2009, 2010). That they are the only kinds of resources available to improve judgement is itself a fallible judgement subject to re-examination as 
our understanding of reason improves. For a more detailed examination of them, see Hooker (2010) and also, Hoffmaster and Hooker (2017), which is devoted to showing how 
OFNR expands and enriches ethical judgement formation, and largely confines itself to that account.
10 - For more on the proposed UPS see Hooker (2017). For its background see respectively Farrell and Hooker (2007a, b, 2009) (science), Farrell and Hooker (2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015) (design), Christensen and Hooker (2000, 2002) (bio-organisation). For a direct connection to the psychology of problem solving expertise, see e.g. Christensen et al. (2015, 
2016). The cognitive psychology or science of problem solving has a rich history, with many important insights gained. For a general introduction to the twentieth century work 
see e.g. the Wikipedia entry under ‘Problem Solving’. Various parts of the problem solving process presented here have echoes in that history, e.g. the emphasis on the construction 
of higher order, more generic knowledge here references Simon’s original idea of learning by doing (Newell and Simon 1972, Simon 1996).
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ory across the nodes that can track overall framework value cre-
ated. Then as problem solving proceeds the possibility nodes are 
re-visited, in various orders as their outcome trends in coher-
ent frameworks indicate. Eventually, a coherent framework, or 
several closely related frameworks, emerge that deliver superior 
outcome value against outcome criteria, and one is developed 
and adopted as the solution. 
Investigator knowledge for a particular problem solved includes 
the variety of relevant frameworks, their occasions of use and 
their performances. This knowledge can subsequently be drawn 
upon to adapt frameworks, that is, problem formulations, meth-
ods, etc., to suit new problem circumstances. In this way investi-
gators become increasingly better equipped to pursue solutions 
as they accumulate specific investigatory experience, both suc-
cessful and not. That is, they develop expertise. This provides 
a model of the specific structures of expertise, its applications 
and limits.
In this organisation of learning, while investigators are learning 
to solve particular problems, they are also learning the nature 
of the class of problems and how to solve them. This double 
learning is the key to the problem solving power of the process. 
For instance, because investigators are now more sensitively at-
tuned to how to investigate, in particular understanding the pos-
sible sources of success and failure, they will also be that much 
sharper at recognising and evaluating (learning) new particular 
sources of success and failure posed by new specific problems. 
In short, by learning a higher-order characterisation of the 
problem class they will have been learning how to learn about 
problem solving in the domain while learning how to solve spe-
cific problems. This doubly integrative higher order structure 
(within and between nodes), fed back to improve problem solv-
ing, is the fundamental bootstrap required for all learning to be 
improvable. It forms the key to understanding the organisation 
and power of the problem-solving process. 
Furthermore, this process allows the rational resolution of ini-
tially ill-defined problems, problems whose formulation and 
structure is vague, gappy or ambiguous, or tacitly internally con-
flicted, or whose valid methods are unsure, like how to marry 
well, or validly test a theory in a new domain. Such problems of 
necessity lie at the root of every new problem solving domain. 
Ill-definedness is equivalent to the absence of identified and 
evaluated possibilities at one or more nodes. These deficien-
cies are corrected essentially by adding the missing information 
piecemeal, and then filling in intra- and inter- node integration, 
as trials proceed. The bank branch designer faced an initially 
ill-defined problem in respect of the relevant constraints and 
methods, but overcame the consequent procedural difficulties 
through filling in new possibilities as the investigation proceed-
ed, brought about by introducing new constraints (multi-storey) 
and expanding and adapting methods. These processes can take 
from minutes to months to decades or even centuries.11 
This UPS process also captures the basic bio-organisation of in-
telligence. The bootstrap process organisation uniquely realises 
Self-Directed Anticipative Learning (SDAL), the higher order 
capacity to use feedback from action (trials) to adapt the pro-
cess of forming adaptations. That is, it is to exercise adaptabili-
ty, especially cognitively-based behavioural adaptability, and to 
do so in a way that is substantially in the control of the agent 
(self-directed) and oriented to anticipating relevant, normative-
ly assessable, feedback. Adaptability is achieved through use of 
the higher order generic knowledge for the domain to modify 
the strategies for problem solving to suit the context. SDAL is 
arguably the fundamental organisational marker of intelligence 
and was shown to lie at the heart of the improvement process in 
Ape language research (note 10).
 4.2.3. Assessing the UPS process
It is time to briefly assess the proposed UPS process. First, it 
is not a machine, not a formal programme, does not require a 
strictly ordered state sequence, not even with deterministic 
node decisions, and not self-contained. But it supplies the mod-
el that grounds all learning and it utilises only a small set of ge-
neric features, specialised by context, to do so. It provides the 
basic learning bootstrap, powerful enough to solve ill-defined 
problems, powerful enough to rationalise revolutionary transi-
tions. It specifies a universal process, so unifying science process 
with design process and similarly all cognate learning domains 
(law, ethics, sleuthing, ...). And it is grounded in design research, 
cognitive psychology, a study of research into ape language and 
many other intuitive examples, and put to work in an extended 
examination of applied ethics (Hoffmaster and Hooker 2017). 
Now it is time to pull all the strands together to see if they make 
at least the beginnings of a different and improved paradigm 
for understanding science. The formalist paradigm was a fail-
ure from the outset, it did not need complex systems to show it 
so. But the growing awareness of complexity issues helped point 
in another direction, to understanding science as a dynamical 
learning process in a complex epistemic system (and design, 
law, ethics ...analogously). The model here is the proposed new 
systems explanatory paradigm noted under Q2: between the 
preceding staircase of sequential stages and the succeeding 
systems dynamical process perspective there is a deep shift in 
the explanatory questions asked, plus the refusal to exclude any 
condition from requiring explanation. 
Root conception of science: not a machine generating log-
ical truths, but a complexly organised net of fallible problem 
solving (UPS) processes running on a wide range of spatial and 
temporal scales, and that improves itself: data, methods, theo-
ries, instruments and goals, and institutions. Its SDAL bootstrap 
drives scientific learning. Improvement includes performance 
against the epistemic values — for example, reliability, preci-
sion, accuracy, applicability/ manipulability, breadth and depth, 
each applying to data, methods, theories and instruments — and 
improvement of those value categories themselves, along with 
improvement of the local pragmatic proxy goals through which 
we pursue them.
 
Root conception of rationality: not applied formal reason, 
but a non-formal process of producing improvement through 
11 - Or be unresovable. It is easy to specify external conditions that render problems insoluble, e.g. requiring a solution in much less time than it takes to study the dominant dyna-
mics to the required reliability. These should not count against any UPS process. Even here our proposed UPS process will have rich resources with which to negotiate a problem 
transform that permits a more coherent response. As for difficult identification of missing possibilities, it is fair to suggest that every outstanding unification problem in physics, 
for example of relativity and quantum mechanics, is an ill-defined problem of this sort.
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applying, to the maximum feasible extent, the resources of ob-
servation, reasoning, creative construction and critical appraisal 
within UPS structures. The primary object of rationality is pro-
cess: outcomes are rational if they are the result of a rational 
process. The recognition that the UPS is successful cognition 
then grounds a (fallible, revisable) methodological norm of full 
use of that UPS in science (modulo correction for science-re-
vealed biases and errors).
 
Traditional methods: the coherent integration of the classic 
philosophies of method [induction, falsifiability, ... ], is achieved 
by now treating them as variously useful learning policies for 
pursuing the epistemic values. All of these pursuits potentially 
conflict, requiring compromise and/or institutional spread of 
alternative pursuits to spread normative risk. (See e.g. Hooker 
(1981) for an initial discussion, Herfel and Hooker (1996, 1999), 
Hooker (2003) for earlier work on a systems perspective, with 
Andersen (2016) adding a recent perspective.)
 
Scientific roles: scientists act as epistemic entrepreneurs, 
investors, project managers and consumers, of valuable knowl-
edge and expertise and the epistemic rules governing epistem-
ic pursuit and assessment of valuable knowledge emerge from 
these pursuits as a higher order knowledge, this time of institu-
tional epistemic design built up over many trials. This provides 
an ‘internal’ conceptualisation or modelling of what drives the 
research process and how it is organised, the making of a new 
paradigm for that activity. But it does not reduce the recalcitrant 
aspects (above) of modelling the external, institutionalised pro-
cess. There is no principled barrier to conjoining the two mod-
els, and doing so will be required for a completed paradigm.
5 – Conclusion 
The advent of complex systems brings with it fundamental chal-
lenges and changes throughout our understanding and use of 
science.
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